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Abstract: Investor sentiment and attention are often linked to the same non-economic 
14 
15 events making it difficult to understand why and how asset prices are affected. We disentangle 
16 
17 these two potential drivers of investment behaviour by analysing a new dataset of medals for 
18 
19 
20 major participating countries and sponsor firms over four Summer Olympic Games. Our results 
21 
22 show that trading volume and volatility are substantially reduced following Olympic success 
23 
24 
although returns appear to be largely unaffected. Analysis of data from on-line search volumes 
26 
27 and surveys measuring investor sentiment, also suggest that the market impact of the Olympics 
28 
29 is linked to changes in attention. 
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Oh enjoying the thrill of the chase is fine. Craving the 
distraction of the game, I sympathize entirely. 
But sentiment, sentiment is a chemical defect found in the losing side. 
Sherlock Holmes, A Scandal  in  Belgravia (BBC, 2012) 
14 The   central idea   in  this   paper   is  that major  non-economic  events, such as soccer 
15 
16 
matches, holidays or good weather, cannot be used as an indirect proxy of sentiment, as 
18 
19 they also affect the attention of investors. Information and behavioural biases, such as 
20 
21 those caused by sentiment, are reflected in asset prices only to the extent that investors 
22 
23 
pay  attention   to market-related  activities. In this sense, attention is a prerequisite for 
25 
26 shifts in the mood of investors, a necessary but not sufficient condition for financial 
27 
28 impact. If investors are distracted by the loss of the team they support, for example, the 
29 
30 
decline in their mood may not find its way into the stock market. What we may observe, 
32 
33 however, is a reduction in market activity. Our research sheds doubt on the unbiasness of 
34 
35 non-economic events as proxies of investor behaviour and justifies a deeper investigation 
36 
37 1 
38 of the joint importance of sentiment and attention. 
39 
To this end, we analyse a new 
40 
dataset of medal results over four Summer Olympic Games for eight major economies 
42 
43 (US, UK, France, Australia, Netherlands, Germany, South Korea and Japan) and five 
44 
45 multinational sponsoring firms (Coca Cola, McDonald’s, Panasonic, Visa, Samsung). We 
46 
47 
ask if the stock market impact of the Games and gold medals is due to a shift in the 
49 
50 mood of investors or to a distraction of their attention. Results indicate that there is no 
51 
52 significant statistical association between medal performance and abnormal returns over 
53 
54 
55 the   next  trading  day. However, trading volumes and volatility are significantly lower 
56 
57 during Olympic Games and are further reduced as a function of the gold medals won over 
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the previous  day.   For  example,  for each gold medal  won by the  U.S., the trading volume in 
4 
5 
6 the  S&P  500 firms  is  almost  3% less on  the  following day. For Germany and South Korea, 
7 
8 this decrease is  even  higher at 6.7%  and  7.3%,  respectively.   These statistical   regularities 
9 
10 
can  be   exploited through  simple  volatility   trading  strategies  in  the   U.S.  which produce 
12 
13 positive profits in excess of those from a passive approach. Our results are consistent with 
14 
15 recent theories of investor attention, but cannot be explained on the basis of investor 
16 
17 
sentiment. We also show that Olympic Games have an impact on a more direct measure 
19 
20 of investor attention based on online search volumes, but not on direct survey-based 
21 
22 measures of investor sentiment. We conclude that in the case of Olympic Games, it is 
23 
24 
25 investor attention rather than mood that is driving the effect on the stock market. 
26 
27 Our study follows De Long et al. (1990) and other researchers arguing that irrational 
28 
29 
investors  may also  exist in  the market that are influenced by psychological and 
31 
32 behavioural factors. We concentrate on two of these factors, investor sentiment and 
33 
34 attention, for three main reasons. First, although a considerable amount of research is 
35 
36 
devoted on showing the significant empirical effects of these factors on financial markets, 
38 
39 they are treated separately in the literature (examples for sentiment include Saunders Jr 
40 
41 1993; Barberis et al. 1998; for attention see Barber and Odean 2008; Peng and Xiong 
42 
43 
2006). Since attention and sentiment may have a similar impact on investors, a joint 
45 
46 investigation of their importance is justified. For example, sentiment is often proxied on the 
47 
48 basis of exogenous events, such as sports outcomes, which are considered to have a 
49 
50 
51 significant impact on the mood of investors (see Edmans et al. 2007). However, investor 
52 
53 attention may also be significantly affected during these events which raises concerns about 
54 
55 
their  unbiasness  as  sentiment  proxies.  Although   not   studied    in this paper, our results 
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suggest more  generally   that the use  of  continuous variables  for capturing investor 
4 
5 
6 sentiment, such as temperature or cloudiness, potentially suffer from the same problems. 
7 
8 Our research produces interesting   new   evidence   about  the validity of competing 
9 
10 
hypotheses and theoretical models of investor sentiment and attention. This allows us to 
12 
13 better understand how economic agents operate within markets and if their motivation is 
14 
15 more behavioural or rational. Second, our study is one of the few in the literature which 
16 
17 
examines the impact of sentiment and attention at both the market and firm level. In 
19 
20 addition to increasing the robustness of the results, this is important since it is possible 
21 
22 that effects are diluted at the aggregate level due to noise or heterogeneity between firms 
23 
24 
25 (Baker and Wurgler, 2007). Finally, correctly measuring the effects of sentiment and 
26 
27 attention has practical implications for the design of superior event-driven investment 
28 
29 
strategies (Kaplanski and Levy, 2010a; Coakley, Dotsis, Liu and Zhai, 2014). 
30 
31 
32 Our previously unexplored dataset of Olympic Game medals offers advantages over 
33 
34 existing data drawn from other sports, such as soccer matches and the Super Bowl, used 
35 
36 
by other studies. This is because the Olympic Games are more likely to affect significantly 
38 
39 the behaviour of investors since they constitute the most globalised and important sports 
40 
41 event in terms of national and corporate impact. This means that we can adopt different 
42 
43 
units of analysis which include developed and developing participating countries along 
45 
46 with multinational sponsoring firms. For example, compared to the 2010 FIFA World Cup, 
47 
48 which is another important sports event of comparable importance (Edmans et al., 2007; 
49 
50 
51 Ehrmann and   Jansen, 2012), the 2012 Summer Olympics involved 204 countries 
52 
53 (compared to 32 which qualified in the FIFA), 26 sports (1, soccer), 219.4 million TV 
54 
55 
viewers in the U.S. (94.5 million), $13.6 billion in organising costs ($3.6 billion), $5.6 
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billion worth  of advertising   ($36  million)  and  $100 million  for  each  of 11 partners worth 
4 
5 
6 of partner sponsorship  deals  (between  $24 to  $44 million  for  each  one  of 6 partners every 
7 
8 year  from 2007 to  2010) (data  drawn  from IOC  and  FIFA  websites and  various newspaper 
9 
10 
articles).   For  the  2008 Olympics,  it  is estimated that up  to  4.7 billion  viewers (or  70% of 
12 
13 the world population) watched some part of the coverage (Press release, Nielsen Media 
14 
15 Research, 8 September 2008). In the U.S. alone, the London Olympics constitute the 
16 
17 
most-watched television event on NBC with an average of 31.1 million viewers and 
19 
20 unprecedented traffic, consumption and engagement on digital platforms (NBC Press 
21 
22 Release, 14 August 2012). The economic, social and political importance of the Olympics 
23 
24 
25 means that evidence about their effects on the stock market is highly relevant for 
26 
27 organisers, policy makers and advisors. Our findings concerning the impact of the Olympics 
28 
29 
on individual sponsor firms are particularly useful for managers in these firms but also for 
30 
31 
32 investors and market makers. 
33 
34 
35 
36 
2. Literature 
38 
39 Since  the  seminal   work  of  De  Long  et   al.   (1990),   several   papers argue that the 
40 
41 behaviour of some investors deviates from the norm of full rationality which underlies 
42 
43 
the   standard   model of  market efficiency. Whilst this literature takes several different 
45 
46 directions (for a review see Barberis and Thaler, 2002; Shiller, 2003; Baker and Wurgler, 
47 
48 2007), we concentrate here on the work related to sentiment and attention. Although 
49 
50 
51 these two effects are treated separately, we show how they are related and focus on their 
52 
53 joint investigation. A brief overview of each literature follows. 
54 
55 
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The   interest  in  the   role  of  sentiment,  feelings,  mood  and  emotions  in  business and 
4 
5 
6 finance  stems from  the seminal  work  of  Kahneman and Tversky (1979).  Research  in  this 
7 
8 area   builds  on  evidence  from  experimental  psychology  and  economics  and  studies how 
9 
10 
investors  are  affected  in  the  evaluation   of  information,  risk,  gains  and  future prospects. 
12 
13 Investor sentiment is estimated in empirical studies using a variety of approaches (Baker 
14 
15 and Wurgler, 2007; Bathia and Bredin, 2013). Direct measures involve posing questions to 
16 
17 
investors through surveys, such as those undertaken by the American Association of 
19 
20 Individual Investors, Investors Intelligence, etc. General surveys of consumer confidence, 
21 
22 such as the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index, are also sometimes used 
23 
24 
25 as they are known to have a close relationship to investor sentiment. Indirect proxies 
26 
27 typically assume that sentiment is influenced through the psychological mechanism of 
28 
29 “mood  misattribution”  (Ross,  1977). Simply put, sports success or sunny weather 
30 
31 
32 influence the mood of some investors and make them more optimistic. In turn, this makes 
33 
34 them more willing to enter into long positions, which leads to higher returns in the short- 
35 
36 
run. The causal link between the actual events and the mood of investors is based on 
38 
39 evidence from psychology which demonstrates, for example, that certain events influence 
40 
41 the   general   mood  in the  population (Kavetsos and Szymanski, 2010; Dawson et al., 
42 
43 
2014). 
45 
46 As noted by Edmans et al. (2007), the two principal approaches for indirectly 
47 
48 measuring investor sentiment are based on continuous variables and a single event 
49 
50 
51 respectively. The continuous variables used include: weather conditions (Saunders Jr, 
52 
53 1993;  Hirshleifer  and Shumway, 2003; Symeonidis et al., 2010; Schmittmann et al., 
54 
55 
2014), lunar cycles (Yuan et al., 2006) and market variables (e.g., performance, types of 
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trading, derivatives   positions;  see  Brown  and  Cliff  2004). Event  based  studies  use, for 
4 
5 
6 example, aviation  disasters  (Kaplanski  and  Levy,  2010b);   changes   to  and  from daylight 
7 
8 saving (Kamstra et al.,  2003) and  holidays  (Frieder and  Subrahmanyam, 2004). Finally, 
9 
10 
another   proxy   for  sentiment  that    is  popular   recently   is  based   on the  textual analysis 
12 
13 of news (Tetlock, 2007; Loughran and McDonald, 2011; Ferris et al., 2013). Overall, the 
14 
15 empirical evidence has shown that sentiment is associated with stock returns in an 
16 
17 
asymmetric manner according to which poor mood has a stronger effect (see, for example 
19 
20 Edmans et al., 2007; Kaplanski and Levy, 2010a). Beyond the first moment, there is some 
21 
22 controversy in the literature concerning the link between investor sentiment and market 
23 
24 
25 volatility.  A   comprehensive   study   by   Symeonidis, Daskalakis,  and Markellos (2010) 
26 
27 demonstrates that good mood, as proxied by weather and environmental variables, is 
28 
29 
associated with increased volatility. 
30 
31 
32 Within the sentiment  literature,   our  paper is related to   an  influential study by 
33 
34 Edmans et al. (2007) that proposes sports results as an indirect investor mood proxy. 
35 
36 
The authors argue that losses in international games of soccer, cricket, rugby and 
38 
39 basketball induce a negative mood which in turn leads to lower returns in the stock market 
40 
41 over the next day. In line with the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), the 
42 
43 
44 effect of match results is asymmetric since wins are found not to affect returns. Further 
45 
46 evidence of the economic significance of these results is presented by Kaplanski and Levy 
47 
48 
(2010a). At the firm level, Chang et al. (2012) show that National Football League (NFL) 
49 
50 
51 game losses lead to lower next-day returns for locally headquartered NASDAQ firms. The 
52 
53 importance of sports sentiment for the stock market is also analysed in Super Bowl (US) 
54 
55 
by Krueger and Kennedy (1990), in soccer (UK) by Ashton et al. (2003), in horse-racing 
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(Australia) by Worthington  (2007),  in rugby  by  Boyle and  Walter (2003) and in cricket 
4 
5 
6 (India) by Mishra  and  Smyth (2010).  Finally, Bernile  and  Lyandres (2011) and Palomino et 
7 
8 al.  (2009),  show  that  investor  sentiment  is  important  for  stock  prices  of  publicly traded 
9 
10 
soccer clubs. 
12 
13 The exploration of attention in finance also stems from studies in psychology which 
14 
15 deal   with   the   limitations  to  rationality  (Simon,   1957; Kahneman,  1973). Part of this 
16 
17 
literature concentrates on how limited attention influences judgments and memory and 
19 
20 leads to behavioural biases such as the halo effect, the illusion of truth and magical 
21 
22 thinking (Yantis, 1998). Another strand emphasises more the nature of attention as a scarce 
23 
24 
25 resource and studies how this is allocated in a positive or normative manner between all 
26 
27 the different decisions and activities that investors are facing (Veldkamp, 2011). The work 
28 
29 
of Sims (2003) studies the limited attention of an economic agent as an information 
31 
32 processing constraint and its implications in dynamic consumption choice. The arguments 
33 
34 for the impact of attention in finance often draw from the vast “dual-task interference” 
35 
36 
literature in psychology which shows convincingly that humans cannot effectively complete 
38 
39 two or more tasks simultaneously (Pashler, 1994). As Ehrmann and Jansen (2012) point out, 
40 
41 attention may be inversely related to the complexity (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008), the 
42 
43 
quantity (Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003), the time horizon (DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009) 
45 
46 and non-saliency of the available information (Huberman and Regev, 2001). Moreover, 
47 
48 attention may differ across time, countries and firms (Barber and Odean, 2008). Some of 
49 
50 
51 the empirical implications that are attributed to attention include the post-earnings 
52 
53 announcement drift, the accrual anomaly, the profit anomaly (Hirshleifer et al., 2011), 
54 
55 
asset mispricing (Brown, 2014), firm valuation (Cumming and Dai, 2011) and the reaction 
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to   stale   news   (Gilbert  et  al.,   2012).   In   terms of  empirical measurement, investor 
4 
5 
6 attention   is   proxied  using   variables such  as distance to   weekends  (DellaVigna   and 
7 
8 Pollet,   2009),  holidays   (Jacobs   and Weber,   2011),  Google  search   volumes  (Da  et al., 
9 
10 
2011),  market   m aker   activity   (Corwin  and  Coughenour,   2008)  and  saliency  of events 
12 
13 (Barber and Odean, 2008). 
14 
15 Although there is growing empirical evidence about the importance of attention, few 
16 
17 
relevant theoretical frameworks exist. DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) develop a model of the 
19 
20 response of stock prices to earnings announcements in which a proportion of investors is 
21 
22 assumed to be distracted. The share of inattentive inventors amplifies the delayed 
23 
24 
25 response of prices to news about earnings. Peng and Xiong (2006) model a representative 
26 
27 investor and solve for her optimal attention allocation in the presence of overconfidence. 
28 
29 
In this model attention is assumed to be fixed and is shown to endogenously lead to 
31 
32 category-learning behaviour where investors tend to process more market rather than firm- 
33 
34 related information. An interesting aspect of this model is that it allows for inattention but 
35 
36 
also   for   sentiment   in   the  form  of  overconfidence. However, this overconfidence is 
38 
39 assumed to affect only the cognitive capacity to process information rather than mood. 
40 
41 Andrei and Hasler (2015) study the joint importance of endogenously determined investor 
42 
43 
attention and uncertainty and show how these drive risk premia and volatility. Increased 
45 
46 attention in their model means that market-related news are informative and volatility 
47 
48 increases while uncertainty is reduced. Although variance and risk premia of stock returns 
49 
50 
51 increase quadratically with attention and uncertainty, attention is a more powerful 
52 
53 driver of volatility. Attention to news varies across time according to changes in the state 
54 
55 
of the economy but is under the direct control of the investor. Schmidt (2013) develops a 
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model  of  rational attention  according  to  which  investors  allocate  more  weight  to market 
4 
5 
6 news   over  firm   specific  news   when  attention   is   scarce.  The  author  proxies attention 
7 
8 scarcity   on  the  basis  of  the  intensity  of  sports-related  search  activity  on  Google. When 
9 
10 
attention  is  distracted  by  sports  events, trading  volumes   are  smaller,  while volatility and 
12 
13 synchronicity become  higher. A  novelty   of  the model  against others in the rational 
14 
15 attention literature (e.g., Sims, 2003; Peng and Xiong, 2006; Kacperczyk et al., 2014) is 
16 
17 
that attention can be allocated between leisure time, such as following sports, and, 
19 
20 learning news which allows obtaining more precise signals for investment decisions. 
21 
22 Within the attention literature, our study is related to Ehrmann and Jansen (2012) and 
23 
24 
25 Schmidt (2013) who use sports events to capture inattention amongst investors. Ehrmann 
26 
27 and Jansen (2012) analyse high frequency data to show that market level trading volumes 
28 
29 
and   co-movements  with   global  stock   returns  are   reduced   during soccer  matches and 
31 
32 goals. In our paper, rather than looking at what happens during sports events, we focus 
33 
34 on the subsequent short term effect that these events have on stock market activity. 
35 
36 
Our study of data related to Olympic Games is not novel in the literature although our 
38 
39 perspective is original. The economic, social and political significance of the Olympic 
40 
41 Games  has  motivated researchers   to   examine their  impact empirically for hosting 
42 
43 
44 countries (see the review by Kavetsos and Szymanski 2010) and sponsoring firms (Farrell 
45 
46 and Frame, 1997;  Miyazaki  and   Morgan,   2001;  Hanke   and   Kirchler,   2013)  but the 
47 
48 
evidence has been largely inconclusive. Several studies suggest that the Olympics may 
49 
50 
51 have “well-being”, “feel-good” or “happiness” benefits stemming from attending events, 
52 
53 volunteering, national pride, etc. For example, Kavetsos and Szymanski (2010) use a 
54 
55 
variety of major sporting events, including Olympics, to demonstrate significant feel- 
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good  effects  in  the   short  term  for hosting  countries. However, they also find that the 
4 
5 
6 association between national athletic success and happiness is statistically insignificant in 
7 
8 their  sample  (further  support  to  these  results   is  given  by  Oxford  Economics  2012). As 
9 
10 
emphasised  by  Kavetsos  and  Szymanski  (2010) and  Dawson et  al.  (2014),  exploring the 
12 
13 impact of Olympic Games on happiness is important since this is assumed as given by 
14 
15 politicians and it is adopted as a primary policy objective. For example, one of the two 
16 
17 
strategic priorities that the Blair Government set out in the bidding for, and hosting, the 
19 
20 London  Olympics  in  2012  was  “a sustainable improvement in success in international 
21 
22 competition, particularly in the sports which matter most to the public, primarily because 
23 
24 
25 of the  ‘feel-good  factor’  associated  with  winning ”  (DCMS/ Strategy Unit, 2002, p.12). 
26 
27 Outside the Olympics, Palomino et al. (2009) are one of the few studies that examine 
28 
29 
sports sentiment and investor attention. They use a sample of listed British soccer teams 
30 
31 
32 and study the variation in stock prices conditional to match outcomes and betting odds. 
33 
34 The evidence suggests that investor sentiment has an impact on prices while the effect of 
35 
36 
attention is less clear. Drawing more general conclusions from these results is limited by 
38 
39 the sample used since it includes only 16 firms from one country over three years. 
40 
41 Moreover, these firms are all from the sports industry where shareholders are likely to be 
42 
43 
also fans and are more prone to sentimental effects. 
45 
46 3. Hypothesis Development 
47 
48 
Our hypotheses involve the effect of positive outcomes from major sports events on 
50 
51 investor  sentiment,   attention   and  stock  market  activity. These are motivated by the 
52 
53 literature reviewed in the previous section. First, we examine the direction of this effect on 
54 
55 
stock market activity, as measured by trading volume and volatility, respectively. Sports 
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success is proxied in our study by the number of Olympic medals won by a particular country 
4 
5 
6 or sponsoring firm. 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Hypothesis I: Sports success leads to a decrease in stock market activity 
12 
13 
14 
15 The existing literature on the effect of sports events does not examine this particular 
16 
17 
18 hypothesis and focuses on interpretations that involve investor sentiment alone. We study 
19 
20 the strength and nature of this effect by considering the possibility of both investor 
21 
22 
sentiment and attention. On the one hand, existing theories and evidence from an 
24 
25 investor sentiment perspective suggest that sports success should have a weak or 
26 
27 insignificant positive effect on stock market returns (see Edmans et al., 2007). However, it 
28 
29 
is not clear in the literature what the effect of sentiment is on trading volume and 
31 
32 volatility  (see  Symeonidis   et al.,  2010). On the other hand, the literature on investor 
33 
34 attention predicts a positive relationship between the level of investor attention and 
35 
36 
market activity (e.g., see Andrei and Hasler (2015) for a relevant theoretical justification; 
38 
39 for relevant empirical evidence see Ehrmann and Jansen, 2012; Vlastakis and Markellos, 
40 
41 2012). In our particular empirical setting, there is evidence which implies that the general 
42 
43 
44 population and workers are significantly distracted. For example, in August 2008, when 
45 
46 Olympics took place, the time spent watching TV by all UK viewers was 3,898 minutes 
47 
48 
(2.09 hours per day), compared to 3,418 minutes (1.83 hours per day) in 2007 (Ofcom, 
50 
51 2012), an increase in viewership by 14%. The same report notes survey evidence on the 
52 
53 media  intentions of UK consumers for the London 2012 Games which suggests that 
54 
55 
around one in four people in full time employment reported a priori that they are likely 
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to watch or listen the events coverage at work (for evidence on other sports see also 
4 
5 
6 Lozano, 2011; Hagn and Maennig, 2008). 
7 
8 In order to shed further light on the driving forces behind the market activity effect of 
9 
10 
sports events, we first examine how success  in  Olympic  Games  affects  direct measures  of 
12 
13 investor sentiment under the following hypothesis. 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 Hypothesis II: Sports success has a positive effect on investor sentiment 
19 
20 
21 
22 
In our empirical analysis, we use five proxies for sentiment. First, the Michigan Consumer 
24 
25 Sentiment Index which is based on a monthly telephone survey of a minimum of 500 
26 
27 interviewees. It is calculated from  the balance   between favourable vs unfavourable 
28 
29 
30 responses on 50 core questions concerning views on the financial situation of the 
31 
32 interviewees  and  the  economy  in  general  (for a detailed description see Lemmon and 
33 
34 Portniaguina, 2006). Second, the Wurgler sentiment index which is based on six sentiment 
35 
36 
37 proxies which involve information with respect to closed-end fund discounts, equity share 
38 
39 turnover, first day returns on IPOs, IPO volumes, equity share in new issues and the dividend 
40 
41 
premium (see Baker and Wurgler, 2007). Third, the Dow Jones ESI indicator which is based 
43 
44 on the relative sentiment of text references to the US economy on the basis of 15 major daily 
45 
46 newspapers (see Vazsonyi, 2010). Fourth, the IPSOS Global Primary Consumer Sentiment 
47 
48 
Index (PCSI) which measures consumer sentiment is based on the composite response of 
50 
51 consumers to 11 questions across 24 countries. The questions are about current and future 
52 
53 economic conditions, intentions and expectations, consumer confidence, job security and 
54 
55 
56 investments in the future. Finally, the American Association of Individual Investors Investor 
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Sentiment  Survey (AAII)  indicator  which  measures   sentiment  though  a weekly survey of 
4 
5 
6 individual   investors   with respect   to their   bullish,   bearish, or neutral on the stock market 
7 
8 over the next six months (see Brown and Cliff, 2004). 
9 
10 
In addition to the effect of sentiment, we also examine the hypothesis that Olympic 
12 
13 success may distract investors. 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 Hypothesis III: Sports success has a negative effect on investor attention 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Here we use a direct measure of attention, the Search Volume Index (SVI), which is 
24 
25 based on the intensity of investment related queries on Google (see also Da et al., 2011; 
26 
27 Vlastakis and Markellos, 2012). 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 4. Empirical Analysis 
33 
34 
4.1. Sample description 
36 
37 Our sample covers four Summer Olympic Games (2000, 2004, 2008, 2012) and eight 
38 
39 countries: United States of America, United Kingdom, France, Australia, Netherlands, 
40 
41 
Germany, Japan and South Korea (a full list of the variables and acronyms used in this 
43 
44 study is given in Table 1). These countries are Olympic “superpowers” and consistently 
45 
46 rank at the top positions in terms of the medal winning index over the sample period. It 
47 
48 
is important to study several countries since there is evidence that both sentiment (Jones 
50 
51 et al., 2012) and attention (Ehrmann and Jansen, 2012) may have different effects across 
52 
53 cultures. The U.S. leads in terms of Olympic performance by winning 11.08% of total 
54 
55 
56 medals over the four games studied. The performance of these countries is stable over 
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time  as  indicated   by  the   fact  that   their   total medal  count proportion   per  year  ranges 
4 
5 
6 between  34.76% and  43.05% (for the  US  it  is  10.45%,  10.92%,  11.48% and  11.45% for 
7 
8 2000, 2004, 2008 and  2012 respectively). It  is known  from previous  research  that Olympic 
9 
10 
success  at  the  country  level  is  linked   to   economic  performance   (Bernard   and  Busse, 
12 
13 2004). So, it comes as no surprise that the countries in our sample are significant 
14 
15 economic powers with stock markets that have an important role in the global environment. 
16 
17 
All countries, except for South Korea, can be clearly classified as developed (e.g., see 
19 
20 2014  MSCI market  classification). South Korea is usually classified as an emerging 
21 
22 market (e.g., in MSCI and Dow Jones Global Index), but sometimes appears as a 
23 
24 
25 developed market (e.g., in the Dow Jones Global Total Stock Market and S&P Global 
26 
27 BMI indices). Our sample also includes five firms which have been major (also known as 
28 
29 
worldwide) sponsors for the Summer Olympic Games throughout the period of study: 
30 
31 
32 Coca Cola, Visa, McDonald’s, Panasonic and Samsung. The three first are listed on the 
33 
34 New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) while Panasonic and Samsung are listed on the 
35 
36 
Tokyo Stock Exchange and Korea Exchange, respectively. All firms are multinational 
38 
39 corporations with a global consumer and investment base and a combined capitalisation 
40 
41 of over half a trillion dollars on 1 August, 2012. 
42 
43 
For each country in our sample, we hand collect from a variety of online sources data 
45 
46 on gold, silver and bronze medals won over the sample period.2 Our sample includes all 
47 
48 of the 3,729 medals across 35 different sports won by the eight countries studied between 
49 
50 
51 2000 and 2012. In addition to the overall results, we also study a subsample of medals from 
52 
53 the five most popular sports according to the definition given by the International Olympic 
54 
55 
Committee (IOC). This definition is based on the number of visits to the pages of the 
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IOC website for different sports from January 2004 to 11 February 2005 (see IOC Report 
4 
5 
6 to the 117th IOC Session from 24 May 2005). 
7 
8 
Datastream is used to draw financial data. For each country we collect daily stock prices 
10 
11 and trading volumes related to a major basket index: S&P500 (US), FTSE (UK), CAC 
12 
13 (FRA), ASX (AUS), AEX (NLD), DAX (GER), KOSPI (KOR) and NIKKEI (JPN). As 
14 
15 
in Edmans et al. (2007), we use total returns (assuming that dividends are reinvested) in 
17 
18 local currency since we are primarily interested in the impact for domestic investors. The 
19 
20 MSCI World Total Return (Net) Index is used to approximate the stock market return at a 
21 
22 
23 global level. We also gather daily observations on the following implied volatility indices: 
24 
25 VIX (US), VFTSE (UK), VCAC (FRA), SPAVIX (AUS), VAEX (NLD), VDAX (GER), 
26 
27 
VKOSPI (KOR), VXJ (JPN). Daily measures of realised volatility on a simple 5- minute 
29 
30 estimator are drawn from the Oxford-Man Institute website. Stock price and volume data 
31 
32 for sponsor firms are collected for the five stocks under study. 
33 
34 
Descriptive statistics of the logarithmic returns for the stock indices and firms under 
36 
37 study are summarized in Table 2. As is typical with daily returns, all series are leptokurtotic 
38 
39 with excess kurtosis and in most cases negative skewness. The average return over the whole 
40 
41 
sample is lower than that over the period of the Olympic Games for all countries and 
43 
44 firms, except one (SAM). However, none of these differences are statistically significant 
45 
46 on the basis of a two-tailed t -test. This is a first indication that Olympic euphoria is not 
47 
48 
49 transmitted to the stock market. The most (least) volatile market in the sample is South 
50 
51 Korea (Australia) with an annualised daily standard deviation of 26.7% (16.9%). The 
52 
53 
descriptive statistics indicate clearly that unconditional standard deviation is much lower 
55 
56 over the Olympic period for all but one country (South Korea) and three of the firms (KO, 
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MCD and SAM). For example, the standard deviation of S&P 500 daily returns is 18.3% 
4 
5 
6 lower  during  the  Olympic   Games.   A  two-sided   chi-squared   test   confirms   that these 
7 
8 differences are  highly significant and not due  to  sample  error. A  further investigation of 
9 
10 
the effect on  stock market activity indicates that unconditional measures of  implied volatility, 
12 
13 realised volatility and trading volume tend to be significantly lower than average during 
14 
15 the Olympic Games compared to the complete sample. For instance, the average implied 
16 
17 
and historical volatility is more than 30% lower for the countries studied. Average trading 
19 
20 volume is over 20% (16%) less for countries (firms). These results suggest that whilst 
21 
22 returns seem to be unaffected during Olympics, market activity is significantly less for all 
23 
24 
25 markets and all but one of the sponsor firms (SAM). However, since market activity may be 
26 
27 significantly influenced by market conditions and calendar effects, a further investigation 
28 
29 
in a regression framework is undertaken in the following section. 
30 
31 
32 The final step in our preliminary analysis is to test for stationarity. Results from 
33 
34 Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron tests, available upon request, suggest 
35 
36 
that both our logarithmic return and volume series do not contain a unit root. 
38 
39 4.2. Hypothesis I: Sports success leads to a decrease in stock market activity 
40 
41 We follow the two-stage event study approach of Edmans et al. (2007) in investigating the 
42 
43 
44 effect of Olympic medals on returns, volatility and trading volume. The last two are used as 
45 
46 proxies for market activity. We analyse returns in order to compare results with those obtained 
47 
48 
from other sports in the literature. In the first stage of our event study, we treat the series in 
50 
51 order to remove the effect of the market and calendar regularities: 
52 
53 
54 
55 Rit   = þiO  + þi1Mt  + þi2Rit–1 + þi3Mt–1 + þi4Mt+1 + þi5MONt+yi1D1t + cit (1) 
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8 
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11 
yijDjt + cit (3) 
12 Where Rit , TVit and VOLit is the return, volume and volatility for country or firm i at time 
13 
14 t, respectivelly. MONt is a calendar dummy variables for Monday. Djt, with j = 1, 2, …, 12, 
16 
17 is a calendar dummy variable for months with January taking the first value. Mit is the 
18 
19 market portfolio index which is proxied using a MSCI global and national index return in 
20 
21 
the case of countries and firms, respectively. The specification of the models follows 
23 
24 Edmans et al. (2007) and includes leading and lagging values in order to account for 
25 
26 autocorrelations and microstructures. 
27 
28 
29 In  the  second  stage  we  regress  the   estimated  residuals cî t from the above regressions 
30 
31 against gold medals won by each country over the previous day (if gold medals are won 
32 
33 
when the market is closed, these medals are aggregated in order to capture a compound 
35 
36 effect on attention): 
37 
38 
39 cî t = bi1GOLDit–1 + bi2GAMESt + uit (4) 
41 
42 
43 
44 
GOLDit–1 in the case of countries is the number of gold medals won by country i over the 
46 
47 previous trading day. When analysing sponsor firm series, GOLDit–1 is the number of 
48 
49 medals at a national level in the country where the firm is listed. We also use an 
50 
51 
52 alternative measure which includes the total number for the eight countries analysed. 
53 
54 The two measures allows us to investigate effects for sponsor firms at a local and global 
55 
56 
level, respectively. We also include a dummy (GAMESt) in order to capture any systematic 
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effects that may occur over the whole Olympic period. This will capture a possible general 
4 
5 
6 positive spirit or higher level of distraction during the days Olympic Games. 
7 
8 In  addition   to  gold  medals,  we  estimate the   regressions   using   silver,   bronze and 
9 
10 
total   medals (sum  of  gold,  silver  and  bronze)  along  with  medals  won  in  the  five  most 
12 
13 popular   sports   (including   gold,  silver,  bronze  and  total   medals). Following Kaplanski 
14 
15 and Levy (2010a), in addition to looking at the effect of medals for each one of the eight 
16 
17 
countries and five firms, we also look at the collective effect that the total number of 
19 
20 medals  for all countries has  on the  U.S. stock market. These different ways of measuring 
21 
22 sports success and impact add robustness to our analysis and shed more light on our 
23 
24 
25 hypotheses. 
26 
27 4.2.1 Effect of Olympic Success on Stock Returns 
28 
29 
In line with the previous literature, we find that success in terms of Olympic medals 
31 
32 is not significantly related to stock returns at the market and sponsor firm level (results 
33 
34 available upon request). The nature of the sports we are studying and our dataset means 
35 
36 
that only success can be directly measured for most sports. For example, for soccer, which 
38 
39 involves two teams it may be possible to identify a winner and loser during the final but 
40 
41 for the marathon the silver medal may not be considered a failure. Since betting odds data 
42 
43 
44 are not readily available for Olympic Games, we attempt an analysis of the unexpected 
45 
46 element in the medals using the average number of medals per country for each sport 
47 
48 
over  the   sample   period   as   an   estimate  of  the expected  result. Specifically, we first 
49 
50 
51 calculate for each sport the likelihood (p1) for each country of winning a medal as the 
52 
53 percentage of medals the country won divided by the total number of medals awarded. 
54 
55 
Then for each Olympic event, we calculate for each sport the actual number of medals 
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won  by  each country (p2). The  difference  between  p1    and  p2    gives  a  proxy  for  the 
5 
6 surprise  element.  This  will  be  positive  (negative)  if  the  country   wins  a  larger (smaller) 
7 
8 proportion of total medals  than expected for each  sport compared to  what it  won  overall 
9 
10 
over  the  complete  sample  of  four  Games.  Rather than using  the  total  number  of medals, 
12 
13 this calculation can be done also on the basis of gold medals only. For example, in 
14 
15 Archery the U.S. won in 2000 (over the four games) a total of two medals (three medals 
16 
17 
over four games), none of which was gold. Therefore, the surprise is zero for gold medals. 
19 
20 The total number of medals in Archery is twelve for each Olympic game so the overall 
21 
22 proportion of medals won by the US over the sample of four Olympics is 6.25% (3÷ (4 
23 
24 
25 × 12)). The actual proportion of medals won in 2000 is 16.67% (2 ÷ 12) so there is a 
26 
27 positive surprise for that event which is 10.42% (16.67%-6.25%) for total medals. This 
28 
29 
allows us to measure positive and negative surprises and assess any asymmetry in the 
31 
32 impact of sports performance. We repeat the regression analysis using surprise-weighted 
33 
34 medal results. The results once again suggest that Olympic performance is not linked to 
35 
36 
stock returns. Conclusions are comparable even if we allow for an asymmetric effect of 
38 
39 positive and negative surprises in the test regression (4). Our measure of surprise has the 
40 
41 limitation of not being able to capture large investments by a country in sport which shift the 
42 
43 
expectations and chances of achieving better results. Under such circumstances, our deviations 
45 
46 from the historical norm will appear incorrectly as positive surprises. However, as we consider 
47 
48 a large number of sports and country investments tend to be more focused, the effects are 
49 
50 
51 probably not very strong. A much more accurate measure of surprise could be based on 
52 
53 betting odds. Unfortunately, such an analysis was not possible as the necessary data was not 
54 
55 
available at the time this study was undertaken. 
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4 
5 
6 4.2.2 Effect of Olympic Success on Trading Volume 
7 
8 The results in  Table 3  confirm  our  descriptive analysis and indicate  an  inverse relationship 
9 
10 
between the  number  of gold medals and trading  volume  over  the  next day  for all countries 
12 
13 and firms, except for Japan. In other words, the results confirm the effect of attention on 
14 
15 trading volume. In all cases, except UK, Australia, Japan, Coca Cola and Panasonic, the 
16 
17 
relationship is statistically significant at the 10% level. Comparable results are obtained 
19 
20 for the alternative measures of success. As expected, gold medals appear to have a more 
21 
22 
significant impact  on volume compared  to  silver medals  with  the  average coefficient b in 
23 
24 
25 regression (4) being on average higher in magnitude for the countries studied (-0.0507 for 
26 
27 gold compared to -0.0454 and -0.0345 for silver and bronze, respectively). 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 4.2.3 Effect of Olympic Success on Volatility 
33 
34 Similar conclusions are reached from the analysis of realised and implied volatility indices 
35 
36 
37 shown in Table 4. The relationship is correctly signed in all regressions but one (Australia) 
38 
39 and   is  statistically  significant  at   the   10%  level  in most  cases. Results are highly 
40 
41 
significant  for the  U.S., Germany and Netherlands. The magnitude of the coefficient for 
42 
43 
44 each   individual  country  is   small,  implying   a marginal effect. However, the collective 
45 
46 impact  of   all   countries   on   the   U.S. stock  market is significant and substantial in 
47 
48 
magnitude, with each additional gold medal decreasing realised volatility by almost 20%. 
50 
51 Following Edmans et al. (2007), we also test our hypothesis by assuming that the 
52 
53 conditional variance o2 of residuals cit 
54 
55 
model of Glosten et al. ( 1993): 
from equation (1) follows the threshold GARCH(1,1) 
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(5) 
9 where Iit–1 = 1 if cit−1 < 0 and 0 otherwise 
10 
11 
12 Where m is the unconditional variance. The results in Table 5 allow similar conclusions to 
13 
14 
15 those obtained from the analysis of implied and realized volatility. For all firms and 
16 
17 countries studied, a negative relationship is found between gold medals and historical 
18 
19 
volatility over the next day and it is statistically significant in most cases (including 
21 
22 US, UK, FRA, JPN, TUS and four of the companies studied). 
23 
24 
The final step in the analysis is to examine if the statistical regularities uncovered are 
26 
27 economically significant. In line with the literature (Kaplanski and Levy, 2010a), we 
28 
29 investigate the U.S. since this is by far the largest market in our sample. Although results 
30 
31 
32 for returns are statistically insignificant they are correctly signed, which motivates us to 
33 
34 examine economic significance. VIX futures and S&P 500 futures contracts are used as 
35 
36 3 
37 underlying assets for trading volatility and returns, respectively. For VIX futures a cost of 
38 
39 $1.2 is assumed per contract side (estimate from CBOE for April 2013). For the S&P 500 
40 
41 
futures the cost was assumed at $3.80 per round-trip transaction (estimate from CME, 
43 
44 effective February 26, 2014). Trading signals are constructed on the basis of medals 
45 
46 awarded since the previous working day. Four different medal results are considered: total 
47 
48 
number of U.S. gold medals, total number of U.S. gold medals in popular sports, total 
50 
51 number of gold medals across all countries and total number of gold medals across all 
52 
53 countries  in popular sports. The results of various active trading strategies against passive 
54 
55 
56 strategies for the VIX and S&P500 are presented in Table 6. The number of contracts per 
1  
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trade was  determined on the  basis  of gold  medals  won  over  the  previous  day.   So,  if U.S. 
4 
5 
6 won   four   gold  medals   over  one   day,   then   according   to   the   first   strategy  four VIX 
7 
8 contracts are  shorted. In  the  case  of the  S&P  500 strategies, a  long  position  in   futures 
9 
10 
contracts is taken  for each gold medal  won.  All trading  positions  last  only for one day. The 
12 
13 results suggest that all volatility trading strategies are highly profitable and superior to a 
14 
15 passive approach. For example, taking a short VIX contract for each U.S. Gold medal won, 
16 
17 
leads to an average daily return of 1.79% with a total of 156 contracts, 60.98% of which are 
19 
20 profitable. Overall, the trading strategies allow similar conclusions to those drawn on the 
21 
22 basis of the statistical analysis. So, the impact of medals on volatility is significant from 
23 
24 
25 both a statistical and economic perspective. The same does not hold for the impact of 
26 
27 medals on returns since they do not lead to any significant results. 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 4.3. Hypothesis II: Sports success has a positive effect on investor sentiment 
33 
34 In this section we examine the association between the Olympic Games and direct 
35 
36 
37 measures of sentiment. We are limited by the availability of data and analyse only the 
38 
39 U.S. using five different measures: the Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index, the Wurgler 
40 
41 
sentiment index, the Dow Jones Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI), the IPSOS Global 
43 
44 Primary Consumer Sentiment Index (PCSI) and the American Association of Individual 
45 
46 Investors Investor Sentiment Survey (AAII). The first four are recorded at a monthly 
47 
48 
interval while the last is in weekly frequency. We perform our analysis over the complete 
50 
51 sample available and over subsamples in order to examine the stability of the results. 
52 
53 We deseasonalise all sentiment indices (SENT) using a regression against a monthly 
54 
55 
56 dummy in order to remove any calendar regularities. We then regress the residuals zt from 
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this regression against Olympic game variables. In the case of the monthly indices the number 
4 
5 
6 of medals cannot be used so we only consider a dummy variable which takes the value of 
7 
8 unity during Olympic  Game  months.  Correspondence  is not  always  perfect  since Olympic 
9 
10 
Games do not cover only one or a whole calendar month.   We include a dummy for each 
12 
13 month if the Olympics cover at least two weeks over that month. In the case of the weekly 
14 
15 AAII sentiment index, we only include the number of medals won (GOLD), by the U.S. and 
16 
17 
all countries in aggregate, over the previous week. We also used the number of medals of the 
19 
20 same week and obtained similar results (results available upon request). 
21 
22 
Results for the monthly indices and the weekly index are given in Table 7 and Table 8, 
24 
25 respectively. In all cases, the Olympics appear to have a positive impact on monthly 
26 
27 sentiment but this link is statistically insignificant. For the weekly index, the effect of 
28 
29 
medals on sentiment tends to be negative but again no relationship is significant. In 
31 
32 line with the literature, these results suggest that the Olympic Games and successes do 
33 
34 not lead to a stronger bullish sentiment amongst consumers and investors. 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 4.4. Hypothesis III: Sports success has a negative effect on investor attention 
40 
41 
Finally, we investigate if the Olympic Games have an impact on investor attention for the 
42 
43 
44 countries in our sample on the basis of the Search Volume Index (SVI) which is based on the 
45 
46 intensity of queries on Google (see also Da et al., 2011; Vlastakis and Markellos, 2012). 
47 
48 
Specifically, we investigate market-wide attention on the basis of SVIs for queries related 
50 
51 to different index names. For example, we use the SVI of “S&P 500” in order to measure 
52 
53 the market attention for US. In line with the approach of Vlastakis and Markellos, (2012), raw 
54 
55 
daily SVIs for each country i are logarithmically transformed and deseasonalised using 
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dummies for each month of the year. As previously, we then regress the residuals from this 
4 
5 
6 regression against the number of medals a country won  over the previous  day. The  results in 
7 
8 Table 9  suggest that the attention  of  investors  depends  inversely on  the  number of medals 
9 
10 
won  over  the previous   day   for  the   stock  markets  under  study. The   coefficients are 
12 
13 correctly signed in all cases except for France, whereas the estimates are statistically 
14 
15 insignificant for France and Japan. Moreover, we obtain similar results if we use number of 
16 
17 
medals from the same day rather than previous days. 
19 
20 Overall, the results reject our second hypothesis and lend support to our third 
21 
22 hypothesis. Combined with the results and discussion in the previous section, the analysis 
23 
24 
25 suggests that the significant impact of Olympic success on market activity is the result of 
26 
27 investor inattention rather than a shift in mood. 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 5. Conclusions 
33 
34 This paper analyses two potential drivers of investment behaviour, sentiment and 
35 
36 
attention, by investigating the Summer Olympic performance for eight participating countries 
38 
39 and five sponsoring firms. The results show that medals have a negative impact on trading 
40 
41 volumes and volatility which is statistically and economically significant. These findings are 
42 
43 
44 in line with theories of attention but cannot be explained easily on the basis of sports 
45 
46 sentiment. Furthermore, we find a positive relationship between medals and a direct measure 
47 
48 
of  investor  inattention  for  all sample countries. However, no significant link was found 
50 
51 between Olympics and investor sentiment on the basis of five different indicators. We 
52 
53 conclude that Olympic Games and medals affect the attention of investors but not their mood. 
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The  recommendation  of  our  paper  is  that  researchers should  pay  more  attention to 
4 
5 
6 “attention” when analysing “sentiment”. We study investor inattention and sentiment in the 
7 
8 context of sports events and performance. However, another empirical setting which is widely 
9 
10 
used  in  the  behavioural  finance  literature  is  related  to  the  weather  and  environmental 
12 
13 conditions. It could be that the positive impact of sunny weather on returns is related also to 
14 
15 investor inattention rather than mood. This possibility is first discussed in Symeonidis et al. 
16 
17 
(2010) as an alternative rational explanation for the negative impact of poor weather on 
19 
20 volatility. The literature suggests that the impact of weather on market activity is likely to be 
21 
22 complex. Goetzmann and Zhu (2005) report that in order to beat the rush, market participants 
23 
24 
25 tend to leave early on rainy days which could have a negative effect on impact due to less time 
26 
27 devoted to work. However, Connolly (2008) show that workers tend to work longer hours 
28 
29 
during rainy days (see also Hagn and Maennig, 2008). Loughran and Schultz (2004) show that 
30 
31 
32 trading volume is lower during blizzards in a city due to travel and weather disruptions. Zivin 
33 
34 and Neidell (2014) show the effect of daily temperature shocks on the allocation of time to 
35 
36 
labor as well as leisure activities. Lee et al. (2014) use arguments from cognitive psychology 
38 
39 along with field and lab data to show that bad weather increases productivity by eliminating 
40 
41 potential cognitive distractions related to good weather. Hamermesh et al. (2008) argue that 
42 
43 
daylight and time zones can induce temporal coordination of economic activities and affect 
45 
46 timing. More research is justified in order to better understand the interaction of investor 
47 
48 attention and sentiment in financial market. 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
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11 
27 
34 
43 
50 
1 
2 
3 
4 Table 1: Variable abbreviations and descriptions 
5 
6    
7 Abbreviation Description 
8    
9 US, UK, FRA, 
10 AUS, NLD, GER, 
12 KOR, JPN 
13 
14 
15 
16 R 
17 
18 
Country label for US, United Kingdom, France, Australia, Netherlands, 
Germany, South Korea, Japan 
 
Stock market index logarithmic return (S&P500: US, FTSE:UK, 
CAC:FR, ASX: AUS, AEX: NL, DAX: GRM, KOSPI: SK, NIKKEI: 
JPN) 
19 
Games Dummy variable denoting the Olympic market period for each 
20 
21 particular country 
22 
23 MSCI Morgan Stanley stock market index for global stock funds in local 
24 
25 currency 
26 RV Realised volatility estimate 
28 Implied Volatility Index (VIX: US, VFTSE:UK, VCAC:FR, SPAVIX: 
29 IV 
30 AUS, VAEX: NL, VDAX: GRM, VKOSPI: SK, VXJ: JPN) 
31 
32 Med 
33 TMed 
35 Gold 
36 
37 TGold 
38 
39 Silver 
40 
41 TSilver 
42 Bronze 
44 TBronze 
45 
46 Popular 
47 
48 TPopular 
49 KO, MCD, 
51 PC, VIS, SAM 
52 
Total number of medals 
Total number of medals from eight countries 
Number of Gold Medals 
Total number of Gold Medals from eight countries 
Number of Silver Medals 
Total number of Silver Medals from eight countries 
Number of Bronze Medals 
Total number of Bronze Medals from eight countries 
Total number of medals from Popular Sports 
Total number of medals from Popular Sports from eight countries 
Coca Cola, McDonalds, Panasonic, Visa, Samsung 
53 VLM Trading volume for each country in USD 
54 
55 SVI Search Volume Index 
56 
57 
58 1 
  
1 
2 
3 Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Stock Market Returns and Firm Returns 
4    
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
JPN -1.94E-04 0.0001 0.0159 -0.1211 0.1323 -0.3770 9.7370 5,612.37 
18    
19 KO 0.0002 0.0028 0.0135 -0.1060 0.1303 0.0077 12.2603   10,729.84 
20 
MCD 0.0005 0.0038 0.0156 -0.1371 0.0898 -0.1860 8.5242 3,834.52 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 JB is the Jarque-Bera (1980) normality test statistic. All values are highly significant at conventional levels. 
29 
30 Mean’ is the average return of local stock market and sponsor firms during the Olympic Period. 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
Return Mean Mean’ St.Dev Min Max Skewness Kurtosis JB 
US -1.56E-05 0.0015 0.0136 -0.0947 0.1096 -0.1531 10.5288 7,101.89 
UK -3.74E-05 0.0011 0.0131 -0.0926 0.0938 -0.1174 8.7981 4,266.43 
FRA -2.08E-04 0.0010 0.0159 -0.0947 0.1059 0.0593 7.6960 2,807.09 
AUS 8.92E-05 0.0006 0.0107 -0.0870 0.0563 -0.4649 8.7701 4,314.02 
NLD -2.30E-04 0.0016 0.0160 -0.0959 0.1003 -0.0437 8.6302 4,032.07 
GER 1.84E-06 0.0008 0.0165 -0.0743 0.1080 0.0378 6.9898 2,017.71 
KOR 3.71E-04 0.0010 0.0168 -0.1280 0.1128 -0.5081 7.8087 2,970.19 
 
PC -0.0004 0.0044 0.0211 -0.2045 0.1739 -0.0649 9.4553 5,214.44 
VIS 0.0010 0.0038 0.0260 -0.1467 0.2501 0.7756 14.4211 6,182.92 
SAM 0.0005 0.0003 0.0246 -0.1480 0.1398 -0.0239 6.9460 1,914.87 
 
  
14 
29 
48 
54 
1 
2 Table 3: The impact of Olympic medals on trading volumes 
3 
4 
Country GMed Med SMed BMed MedP 
5    
6 US -0.0295*** -0.0107** -0.0261** -0.0195 -0.0163** 
7 (-3.2868) (-2.3947) (-2.0221) (-1.5511) (-2.0899) 
8 UK -0.0213 -0.0125 -0.0399 -0.0392 -0.0206 
9 (-1.2370) (-1.3052) (-1.1575) (-1.3203) (-0.8659) 
10 FRA -0.0925** -0.0260** -0.0385 -0.0377 0.0248 
11 
(-2.3349) (-2.2352) (-1.2257) (-1.2743) (0.8487) 
12 
AUS -0.0116 -0.0145 -0.0552** -0.0098 0.0127 
13 
(-0.2269) (-0.8224) (-2.0808) (-0.2357) (0.723) 
15 NLD -0.1109*** -0.0445** -0.1081** 0.0283 0.0034 
16 (-3.2309) (-2.2635) (-2.7234) (0.8392) (0.0569) 
17 GER -0.0668** -0.0282*** -0.0506** -0.0792*** -0.0803** 
18 (-2.4668) (-3.0729) (-1.9726) (-4.1994) (-2.1302) 
19 KOR -0.0732** -0.0279** -0.0205 -0.0832** 0.0792** 
20 (-2.2068) (-2.0196) (-0.7913) (-2.1555) (2.1852) 
21 JPN 0.0006 -0.0133 -0.0241 -0.0353 -0.0279 
22 (0.0187) (-0.8373) (-1.4652) (-1.1187) (-1.4280) 
23 TUS -0.0088*** -0.0029*** -0.0083*** -0.0078** -0.0066** 
24 (-2.9044) (-2.7868) (-2.7695) (-2.4863) (-2.3002) 
25 KO -0.0263 -0.0059 -0.0072 -0.0062 -0.0103 
26 (-1.6396) (-0.7676) (-0.3652) (-0.2664) (-0.8877) 
27 
MCD -0.0685*** -0.0243** -0.0522* -0.0543* -0.0296* 
28 
(-2.9348) (-2.2204) (-1.7193) (-1.7522) (-1.9214) 
30 PC -0.0175 -0.0037 0.0084 -0.0233 -0.0090 
31 (-0.428) (-0.1919) (0.185) (-0.3841) (-0.3112) 
32 VIS -0.0321** -0.0137** -0.0398* -0.0245 -0.0228*** 
33 (-1.9561) (-2.0623) (-1.7351) (-1.1889) (-2.6573) 
34 SAM -0.0940** -0.0177 0.0160 -0.0310 -0.0302 
35 (-2.1648) (-1.3993) (0.4523) (-0.5591) (-0.3126) 
36 
Firms TGMed TMed TSMed TBMed TMedP 
37 
38 KO -0.0059 -0.0018 -0.0052 -0.0043 -0.0047 
39 (-1.0296) (-0.8668) (-0.8610) (-0.6930) (-0.8321) 
40 MCD -0.0182** -0.0067*** -0.0198*** -0.0200** -0.0147** 
41 
(-2.3855) (-2.6167) (-2.8151) (-2.5096) (-2.1734) 
42 
43 PC -0.0057 -0.0021 -0.0073 -0.0055 -0.0024 
44 (-0.4012) (-0.4795) (-0.6207) (-0.4190) (-0.1955) 
45 VIS -0.0115** -0.0040** -0.0113* -0.0112** -0.0117** 
46 (-2.1506) (-2.1526) (-1.9923) (-2.1589) (-2.1477) 
47 
SAM -0.0079*** -0.0025** -0.0060* -0.0078** -0.0086*** 
49 (-2.7386) (-2.4729) (-1.8609) (-2.3051) (-3.2735) 
  
50 This table gives the value of the coefficients bi1 in regression (4) with trading volume as the dependent 
51 variable in regression (2), respectively. Numbers in brackets correspond to t-statistics. 
52 Heteroskedasticity  and  autocorrelation  consistent standard  errors  are  estimated  using  the Newey 
53 and West  (1987) approach.  ***,**,* denote statistical  significance  at  the  1%,  5% and  10% level 
55 respectively.  When  TUS is used,  it is the total number  of medals for  all eight countries,  the  trading 
56 volume corresponds  to  the US. When analysing firms, the number of medals and volume  correspond 
57 to the market where the firm is listed. We also use the total number of medals for the eight countries 
58 analysed in order to capture a more global effect of medals on firms which may result from 
59 international exposure. 
  
9 
1 
2 Table 4: The impact of Olympic medals on realized (RV) and implied (IV) volatility 
3 
4 
5 Market Gold Med Silver Bronze Popular 
  
6 US -6.47E-06** -2.53E-06** -5.99E-06* -5.91E-06 -2.45E-06 
7 (-2.1323) (-2.0395) (-1.7369) (-1.3332) (-1.2905) 
8 
UK -2.36E-06 -1.39E-06 -2.90E-06 -5.58E-06* -2.87E-06 
10 (-0.7723) (-1.0375) (-0.7094) (-1.7421) (-0.4832) 
11 FRA -6.25E-06 -2.40E-06 -8.91E-06 1.17E-06 -2.95E-06 
12 (-1.4008) (-1.1503) (-1.6189) (0.1994) (-0.5169) 
13 
AUS 2.63E-05*** 6.79E-06*** 7.96E-06** 1.90E-05*** -2.00E-07 
14 
15 (9.6316) (4.9323) (2.3015) (4.2385) (-0.0471) 
16 RV 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 IV 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
NLD -2.28E-05*** -1.28E-05** -2.49E-05** -5.21E-06 1.36E-05 
(-2.5821) (-2.4951) (-2.4186) (-0.6886) (0.9854) 
GER  -2.81E-05***  -5.78E-06*  -6.80E-06  -8.90E-06  -22. 9E-05* 
(-3.0275) (-1.8760) (-0.5948) (-0.8131) (-1.8108) 
KOR  -9.58E-06 -3.14E-06 3.85E-07 -1.09E-05** -1.13E-05 
(-1.5441) (-1.1492) (0.0889) (-2.1591) (-0.9621) 
JPN  -5.54E-06 -1.75E-06 -4.84E-06* 1.70E-07 -6.68E-06* 
(-1.6395) (-0.8195) (-1.9455) (0.0281) (-1.8929) 
TUS  -1.98E-06** -6.51E-07** -1.95E-06** -1.70E-06* -1.27E-06* 
(-2.0685) (-2.1270) (-2.2833) (-1.8213)  (-1.9168) 
  
US  -8.91E-06*** -3.38E-06** -7.03E-06* -9.13E-06** -4.40E-06** 
(-3.0842) (-2.4034) (-1.8103) (-2.1787)  (-2.2181) 
UK  -8.36E-06* -4.61E-06** -1.36E-05** -1.42E-05** -3.82E-06 
(-1.8607) (-2.0813) (-2.1143) (-2.1526) (-0.3880) 
FRA  -2.16E-05*** -7.69E-06*** -1.24E-05*** -1.41E-05* 2.23E-06 
(-3.9424) (-3.3655) (-2.6772) (-1.6977)  (0.3070) 
AUS  1.51E-06 -3.39E-06 -9.14E-06 -8.92E-06 2.07E-05 
(0.1003) (-0.7430) (-1.1965) (-0.8987) (2.2783) 
NLD  -5.10E-05*** -2.74E-05*** -3.39E-05** -2.42E-05 -6.54E-06 
(-2.8760) (-2.6227) (-2.1781) (-1.4977)  (-0.5624) 
GER  -2.14E-05** -9.56E-06*** -1.96E-05** -2.52E-05* * -2.26E-05** 
(-2.4126) (-3.0823) (-2.3725) (-3.9920)  (-2.3239) 
KOR  -9.76E-06* -4.05E-06** -5.19E-06 -1.01E-05** -1.03E-05 
(-1.8971) (-2.1672) (-1.0934) (-2.2775) (-0.8131) 
JPN  -7.46E-06 -8.24E-06*** -1.65E-05** -1.54E-05*** -1.41E-05*** 
(-1.1308) (-3.1641) (-2.4126) (-2.8441)  (-3.5145) 
TUS  -2.79E-06*** -9.30E-07*** -2.53E-06** -2.74E-06*** -1.63E-06** 
(-2.7072) (-2.6617) (-2.5109) (-2.6383)  (-2.0250) 
 
This table gives the value of the coefficients bi1 in regression (4) with realised and implied volatility as the 
dependent variable in regression (3), respectively. Numbers in brackets correspond to t-statistics. 
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors are estimated using  the  Newey  and 
West (1987) approach. ***, **,* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
When TUS is used, which is the total number of medals for all eight countries, the realised and implied 
volatility correspond to the US. 
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1 
2 Table 5: The impact of Olympic medals on historical volatility 
3    
4 Market  Gold Total Silver Bronze Popular 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
This table gives the value of the GJR GARCH (1, 1) coefficients δ in model (5). Numbers in brackets 
55 
56 correspond  to z-statistic values. Heteroskedasticity  and  autocorrelation  consistent standard  errors are 
57 estimated using the Newey and West (1987) approach. ***, **,* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
58 5% and 10% level, respectively. When TUS is used, it is the total number of medals for all eight countries, 
59 the historical volatility corresponds to the US. When analysing firms, the number of medals and historical 
US -1.70E-05*** 
(-269.6852) 
-4.48E-07** 
(-2.3188) 
-1.25E-06*** 
(-10.4413) 
-1.58E-06*** 
(-9.1287) 
-6.35E-07*** 
(-4.8870) 
UK -2.30E-06*** -1.06E-05*** -3.69E-06*** -3.09E-06*** -4.91E-06*** 
 (-26.3963) (-13.8386) (-10.8105) (-9.7972) (-13.1744) 
FRA -7.47E-05*** -1.33E-06* -4.30E-05 -5.07E-05** -5.07E-06 
 (-13.9220) (-1.7493) (-1.0983) (-2.3294) (-1.5266) 
AUS -2.40E-05 -3.90E-07 -1.30E-06*** -1.01E-06** -1.73E-06*** 
 (-0.5358) (-1.5621) (-7.7394) (-2.2150) (-3.0274) 
NLD -1.34E-06 -1.33E-06 -3.60E-06 -7.50E-06*** -2.91E-06 
 (-0.4772) (-1.486) (-1.4505) (-4.3284) (-0.9002) 
GER -2.58E-06 -9.73E-07** -3.40E-06 -2.44E-06 -5.83E-06*** 
 (-1.0510) (-2.0099) (-1.9150) (-1.5405) (-2.7802) 
KOR -1.37E-06 -3.50E-05*** -2.57E-05 -5.90E-07 -1.48E-05 
 (-0.2689) (-3.1789) (-0.6330) (-0.0889) (-0.9604) 
JPN -4.96E-06* -1.53E-06 -2.65E-06 -4.09E-06 -3.27E-06 
 (-1.7052) (-1.3138) (-0.6314) (-1.3425) (-1.2054) 
TUS -5.90E-06*** -1.30E-07 -4.15E-06*** -3.98E-07* -3.30E-07 
 (-3.5149) (-1.5684) (-3.2830) (-1.7927) (-1.2111) 
KO -2.12E-06*** -8.30E-07 -1.44E-06 -2.45E-06*** -1.29E-06*** 
 (-7.4879) (-1.2252) (-0.8865) (-5.3442) (-3.7863) 
MCD -2.23E-06*** -3.28E-06*** -2.00E-06** -2.60E-06** -5.46E-06*** 
 (-7.0519) (-6.9751) (-1.9558) (-2.3589) (-2.9376) 
PC -9.93E-05** -4.30E-05*** -3.70E-06 -5.97E-05*** -8.46E-05 
 (-2.5060) (-10.1986) (-0.3402) (-2.6036) (-1.3147) 
VIS -6.51E-05*** -2.69E-06** -9.51E-06* -8.76E-06 -4.28E-06*** 
 (-7.0712) (-2.0945) (-1.6587) (-1.4022) (-7.8150) 
SAM 3.50E-06 -1.22E-08 -4.34E-06 3.14E-07 -7.52E-06 
 (0.2543) (-0.0023) (-0.3206) (0.0160) (-0.1626) 
Firm TGold TMed TSilver TBronze TPopular 
KO -7.40E-07 
(-1.2302) 
-2.43E-07 
(-1.4399) 
-7.22E-07 
(-1.0816) 
-6.40E-07 
(-0.9330) 
-5.52E-07 
(-0.9381) 
MCD -3.83E-06 -1.06E-06*** -3.56E-06*** -6.66E-07*** -7.00E-06*** 
 (-1.5002) (-2.7367) (-9.4940) (-2.7669) (-5.6443) 
PC 3.15E-08 1.32E-08 4.35E-08 4.20E-08 -6.47E-06*** 
 (0.0381) (0.0552) (0.0526) (0.0508) (-17.9240) 
VIS -2.37E-05*** -5.25E-06*** -2.30E-06** -2.46E-06*** -7.19E-06*** 
 (-12.19923) (-36.06726) (-2.2985) (-2.9433) (-8.0901) 
SAM 7.72E-09 -5.10E-09 -6.42E-08 1.18E-08 -9.12E-08 
 (0.0061) (-0.0133) (-0.0496) (0.0089) (-0.0880) 
 
  
1 
2 volatility correspond to the market where the firm is listed. We also use the total number of medals for 
3 the eight countries analysed in order to capture a more global effect of medals on firms which may result 
4 from international exposure. 
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3 Table 6: Economic significance of results: VIX and S&P 500 futures trading strategies 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13
 VIX 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 S&P 500 
23 
24 
25 
26    
27 
28 
Trading signals are constructed on the basis of medals awarded since the previous working day. 
29 
30 Four different signals are considered: total number of US gold medals, total number of US gold 
31 medals in popular sports, total number of gold medals across all countries and total number of gold 
32 medals across all countries in popular sports. 
33 
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37 
38 
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41 
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43 
44 
45 
46 
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48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 1 
59 
60 
1 
2 
3 
US Gold 1.79% 60.98% 
US Popular Gold 1.48% 60.98% 
Total Gold 4.28% 62.79% 
Total Popular Gold 1.96% 61.90% 
Buy & -0.09% 50.00% 
Sell & 0.09% 50.00% 
US Gold -0.36% 56.10% 
US Popular Gold -0.28% 56.10% 
Total Gold -1.56% 55.81% 
Total Popular Gold -0.46% 57.14% 
Buy & -0.01% 50.00% 
Sell & 0.01% 50.00% 
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Table  7: Impact of Olympic Games on monthly sentiment indicators for U.S 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24   (0.0730)  
25 PCSI 2002-2012 1.6052 
26   (0.4299)  
27 
28 This table gives the value of the regression coefficients between various sentiment 
29 indicators and dummies denoting months during which Olympics take place. Numbers in 
30 
31 brackets correspond to t-statistics. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
32 standard errors are estimated using the Newey and West (1987) approach. ***, **,* 
33 denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 1 
59 
60 
Index Sample Coefficient 
Michigan 1952-2012 1.6042 
  (0.4009) 
 1984-2012 -1.3057 
  (-0.2764) 
 2000-2012 1.7240 
  (0.2082) 
Wurgler 1965-2010 0.1474 
  (0.5539) 
 1984-2010 0.2713 
  (1.1774) 
 2000-2010 0.3980 
  (1.4766) 
ESI 1990-2012 0.3419 
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4 Table 8: Impact of Olympic Games and performance on the weekly AAII sentiment for U.S. 
5 
6 
U.S. Med 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
 
t–1 Gold 
 
t–1 Silvert–1 Bronzet–1 Populart–1 
15 This table gives the value of the regression coefficients between sentiment and medals won from the 
16 previous  week   (t − 1).  Numbers  in  brackets  correspond to  t-statistics. Heteroskedasticity and 
17 autocorrelation consistent standard errors are estimated using the Newey and West (1987) approach. 
19 ***, **,* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
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52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 1 
59 
60 
 
 0.0011 0.0031 0.0055 -0.0025 0.0035 
(0.4763) (0.5023) (0.7311) (-0.4756) (0.9552) 
Aggregate TMedt–1 TGoldt–1 TSilvert–1 TBronzet–1 TPopulart– 
 0.0005 0.0017 0.0013 0.0015 0.0022 
 (0.7621) (0.9411) (0.5752) (0.6878) (1.0762) 
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4 Table 9: Impact of Olympic Medals over previous day on investor attention measured by Google 
5 SVI 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24    
25 
26 Numbers in brackets correspond to t-statistics. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
27 consistent standard errors are estimated using the Newey and West (1987) approach. ***, **,* 
28 denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 1 
59 
60 
Market Gold Med Silver Bronze Popular Surprise 
US -0.0652** -0.0275** -0.0585* -0.0963*** -0.0377*** -0.9420 
 (-2.4727) (-2.3706) (-1.8138) (-2.8875) (-2.7616) (-1.2810) 
UK -0.1590*** -0.0788*** -0.1093** -0.2067*** -0.1913** -0.1847 
 (-5.1366) (-4.0962) (-2.5352) (-3.6956) (-2.2801) (-0.2157) 
FRA -0.0415 0.0086 0.0595 0.0053 0.0236 -0.1781 
 (-0.1183) (0.0709) (0.3564) (0.0239) (0.1012) (-0.0572) 
AUS -0.1122*** -0.0615*** -0.1190*** -0.1536*** -0.0708** 1.7402** 
 (-3.4351) (-3.3762) (-2.7703) (-3.4737) (-2.5638) (2.6691) 
NLD -0.1023*** -0.0597** -0.0612 -0.1112** -0.1326*** 1.2210 
 (-2.6119) (-2.4549) (-1.4822) (-1.9838) (-2.8939) (0.7937) 
GER -0.0530 -0.0292** -0.0531 -0.0782** -0.0390 -0.8908** 
 (-1.4282) (-1.9954) (-1.5174) (-2.0302) (-1.1295) (-2.5325) 
JPN -0.0514 -0.0730 -0.2293* -0.1333 -0.0936 0.7331 
 (-0.4962) (-1.0739) (-1.8560) (-1.1939) (-0.8704) (0.3351) 
 
